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What the contract behind “Squid Game” left behind
Any conversation about the global success of Korean drama ends up at “Squid Game.” Yet the intellectual property (IP) of that show, meaning the right to own the content and earn money from it, belongs to Netflix. Viewers remember it as a triumph of Korean storytelling, but the payment that reached its production company did not grow in step with its worldwide popularity. How famous a show becomes and who holds the rights to that fame are settled by separate contracts.
That gap is what Democratic Party lawmaker Han Jun-ho raised during this year’s National Assembly audit. According to Han, Netflix originals are often made under contracts in which the platform covers the production budget and takes the IP. Production companies usually receive a margin of about 3 to 10 percent of the budget, which makes it hard to earn more even when a show becomes a hit. Payment for finishing the work is separated from what happens after release, so the platform and the producer can experience the same success very differently.
The issue is drawing attention again now that Netflix’s revenue in Korea has topped 1 trillion won for the first time. More people are watching Korean content and the platform’s business has grown, but how that growth reaches the Korean subsidiary’s profits and the production companies’ long-term assets is another matter. The accounting figures released at the audit need to be read alongside the production contracts. Put the flow of money earned in Korea next to the ownership of the shows, and the industrial meaning of a hit becomes much more concrete.
Korean revenue grew, but how much operating profit stayed in Korea?
On Oct. 14, Han, the ruling party’s lead member on the National Assembly’s Science, ICT, Broadcasting and Communications Committee, released his analysis of the audit report of Netflix Services Korea. It showed domestic revenue of 1.0542 trillion won in 2025, up 17.2 percent from 899.7 billion won the year before and about 66.9 percent higher than the 631.7 billion won recorded in 2021. The Korean business has clearly grown. Revenue, however, is the money taken in from selling a service, which is different from the operating profit a company keeps after costs.
That same year, the Korean subsidiary paid 853.9 billion won, or 81.0 percent of its revenue, to its U.S. headquarters, largely labeled as “consideration for subscription membership purchases.” Its operating profit came to 20.3 billion won, an operating margin of 1.9 percent. The figures reflect a setup in which subscription fees paid by Korean users are booked as the local unit’s revenue, and the unit then pays the group for providing the service. That is why a business worth 1 trillion won and a thin local margin appear side by side in the same accounts.
The five-year picture looks much the same. Cumulative revenue reached 4.1822 trillion won, and payments to headquarters and related entities totaled about 3.4133 trillion won, or 81.6 percent. Cumulative operating profit was about 81.1 billion won. The share paid to headquarters was 81.0 percent in 2021, 84.2 percent in 2022, 80.7 percent in 2023, 81.4 percent in 2024 and 81.0 percent in 2025. Rather than a spike in one particular year, the numbers show a steady practice of paying a large part of Korean revenue out as intra-group costs.

Payments to headquarters are not the same as profit sent abroad
The full amount paid to headquarters is not net profit made in Korea and taken overseas. It includes intra-group transaction costs tied to running the subscription service and using content. The payment alone cannot tell you how much the group as a whole actually earns from its Korean business. The local income statement shows the Korean subsidiary’s results, but it does not reallocate every global cost and every dollar of revenue to the Korean market.
The distinction matters for the debate over producer compensation, too. Raising the Korean unit’s operating margin and paying Korean producers more for a hit are tied to different contracts and different costs. The budget of an individual show, and any extra reward its producer might get, are set by that show’s contract, not by the share of revenue sent to headquarters. The accounts show how money moves; production contracts show how rights and rewards were divided for each title.
There is also a case for the platform owning the IP. A platform that pays the production budget up front carries the risk that a show will flop. For the producer, the deal secures funding and lets the work get made before anyone knows whether it will succeed. One side takes on the money and the risk of failure, the other does the making. The argument is less about that exchange itself than about whether the original payment is still a fair share once a show becomes a much bigger hit than anyone expected.
Rival platforms’ losses shape producers’ choices
In Korea’s streaming market, Netflix has a far higher paid-usage rate than local services. In the “2025 Broadcasting Media Usage Survey” by Korea’s broadcasting and media regulator, 46.7 percent of respondents paid for Netflix, compared with 13.0 percent for Tving, a gap of about 3.6 times. The figure shows which service people actually pay for. For companies supplying Korean dramas, it also means the outlets available to them differ greatly in size.
The local competitors’ results tell the same story. Tving posted an operating loss of 69.8 billion won in 2025 and Wavve lost 12.2 billion won. While Netflix’s Korean revenue kept growing, the homegrown platforms stayed in the red. To understand how producers negotiate, you have to look at the state of these distribution outlets. Several platforms may buy shows or invest in production, but they do not have the same budgets or the same scale.
For a producer, wanting to keep the IP is one thing. Finding the money to actually make the show is another. A contract that covers the full budget makes production possible right away, while a contract that leaves the rights with the producer keeps open the chance to profit from a later hit. When both are hard to get at once, the choice between a stable budget and long-term rights carries more weight. The losses at local platforms are part of the backdrop to that choice.

Pricier dramas and fewer domestic outlets
The strain on production was laid out at a seminar the Korean Association for Broadcasting and Telecommunication Studies held at the National Assembly on Sept. 10. According to the presentation, as reported by the Digital Times, the number of Korean dramas released each year fell from 141 in 2022 to around 100 in 2024, a drop of about 30 percent. The decline came from broadcasters and local streaming services, while original series for global streamers held steady or increased. The routes by which a Korean drama gets made and reaches viewers are changing.
The same presentation said the production cost per episode rose from 550 million won in 2018 to 3.5 billion won in 2024. Licensing fees, which broadcasters pay for the right to air a show, used to cover 40 to 70 percent of production costs and now cover 20 to 30 percent. Shows cost more to make, while the share of the budget that traditional broadcasters will pay has shrunk. Producers have to fill the rest through other sales or investment deals.
Under those conditions, an offer from a global platform that pays the budget up front can matter more. This is how the overseas popularity of Korean drama and a weakening production base at home can show up at the same time. A worldwide hit proves there is demand, but it does not settle the terms on which money for the next production arrives. Look at release numbers, production costs and licensing fees together, and the IP debate turns out to be about more than splitting a hit. It is about whether there will be a foundation for making the next show.
Back to the question of sharing the success of “Squid Game”
“It is K-content that made Netflix No. 1 in Korea,” Han said. “Responsibility in line with its influence, such as additional compensation based on a show’s performance, must follow.” His demand pushes the discussion beyond the contract signed when the budget was paid and into the relationship after a show succeeds. On top of who carried the risk of failure, it asks how the results should be shared when a show succeeds beyond expectations. At its core, the issue is how stable funding for production connects to rewards for a hit.
Go back to “Squid Game” and the question gets specific. A structure in which Netflix pays the budget and keeps the IP gave the show a framework to be made and released. The same structure made it hard for the producer to use the rights after the show’s global success. One contract held both the advantage that made production possible and the limit on rewards after the hit. Focus on only one side, and it becomes hard to explain why Korean producers sign these deals and why they also ask for more.
The thing to watch is not only how much more Netflix’s Korean revenue grows. It is whether producers can keep the security of a funded budget while gaining room for performance-based rewards and use of their IP. That also depends on how many production options local streamers and broadcasters can still offer. Whether the global success of K-drama turns into budgets for the next show and assets for the companies that make them will show how much of that success the Korean industry gets to keep.
Sources: Ziksir, Oct. 14, 2026; IT Chosun, Oct. 14, 2026; Digital Times, Sept. 13, 2026.
